logs archiveIRC Archive / Oftc / #tor / 2015 / September / 5 / 1
nicoo
It's checked by the BWAuth too
cf https://blog.torproject.org/blog/torflow-node-capacity-integrity-and-reliability-measurements-hotpets
Guest517
who set the flahs thing I see in arm ? im flaged as exit but have ExitPolicy reject *:* in my config
*flags
cacahuatl
They're voted on by the directory authorities
Guest517
ok, so if I just changed my config, flag might be outdated until directory authorities update it ?
cacahuatl
To get an exit flag you need to allow exiting for at least 2 ports, I think 80,443 and 6667
Right, if it's just changed then when the next consensus is produced that should be revised.
Guest517
k thx
tor is a fun thing to play with :)
ultraviolence
hi
yes
95%+ of the hidden services are criminal and pedo
except catfacts
kernelcorn
where's that catfacts site, anyway?
ultraviolence
tips.fbi.gov
         

circ-user-YEXp9_
how is the tor relay server bandwidth calculated?
ultraviolence
math
cacahuatl
It's measured by the bwauths
Guest637
ultraviolence is cptn oblivious :)
ultraviolence
i dont know this user
ive never been on this network before
seems like a bunch of fags
cacahuatl
circ-user-YEXp9_: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torflow.git/tree/NetworkScanners/BwAuthority/README.spec.txt
circ-user-YEXp9_
wow
fu*k you
The Cramps mother fu*ker https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6XH2jt4NmOw
kiss my ass!
exit
mancha
Bug in TBB, if you open many tabs at some point the Onion stops showing the circuit.
ohpal
hi friends
gamambel
mancha: please file a bug report at https://bugs.torproject.org/
EquationGroup
We've broken Tor, it's your hash function, too weak for recent advances. Run & Hide.with recent advances
sej
kbro
ElvisLives
userip kvm234
qwerty1
what does userip do
kernelcorn
qwerty1: I think Elvis was trying to do a WHOIS on another user
quick question: why isn't a good idea for Tor clients to use a guard node that is geographically closest to them? It seems to me that this approach reduces the network distance, thus reducing the probability of interception (avoiding undersea cables, etc), thus decreasing the chances that the attacker is watching both ends of the circuit.
ncl
I assume something to do with a user in somewhere with an oppressive government
ryonaloli_
kernelcorn: that probably is a good idea
however there's not enough research into whether or not the good outweigs the bad (more predictable guard choices)
my guess is that the good *does* outweigh the bad significantly, as long as there are no IXPs between you and your guard
kernelcorn
if guard choices are predictable, what are the implications?
ryonaloli_
a local adversary would likely have more legal power over the guards that you choose
e.g. if you're in the UK and your client selects a UK guard, if an adversary prefers to tap the guard directly because they don't want to or are unable to wiretap IXPs or large ASes, then they'd be in luck if every UK citizen is likely to use a UK guard
but there's just not enough research into all the implications. do check out the paper on the AS-aware port of Tor though, which does something like this automatically.
kernelcorn
that gives them the IP addresses of UK Tor users, which they already have because they can wiretap the directory authorities, then extract the list of all IPs that contacted those dirauths, then extract the list of UK IPs
         

ryonaloli_
it's not about enumerating IPs who use Tor
it'd be about being able to own/control the guard node
and it's a lot easier to demand some small VPS to give law enforcement access to a node than it is to do the same for a major AS
kernelcorn
ok, so how about choosing guards in the same country as you, weighted by consensus weight?
linear
ryonaloli_: link to (or title of) that paper you mentioned a few lines up?
ryonaloli_
read the paper on AS-aware tor, it may give better info about that. but what matters is if it's free of major IXPs
linear: ok, one sec
http://freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/oakland2012-lastor.pdf
>LASTor : A Low-Latency AS-Aware Tor Client
kernelcorn
ah
linear
cheers
kernelcorn
it just seems to me that doing something like this on the client end is a good idea. It doesn't work on the exit end though.
ryonaloli_
yeah, but unfortunately it's not yet integrated into tor....
maybe one day
kernelcorn
I had the idea after re-reading https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_surveillance_disclosures_(2013%E2%80%93present)
I understand that AS-aware routing is a hard problem, (which is probably why it's not in Tor yet) but it's a simpler problem to think about client choices for guard nodes
for example, if I'm at University X, I should use X's guard node because then my traffic to it does not go out through X's border router, out through numerous IXPs before entering the far-away guard that I've randomly chosen.
it just limits the amount of exposure that my circuit has to possible points of surveillance
ryonaloli_
i'd think that would be *too* close to you
kernelcorn
why? They'd know I was using Tor anyway, they can inspect the protocol or check the IPs anyway.
but if I chose the nearby guard, they would be unable to inspect my circuit (since it doesn't go over their border firewall) and an outside observer would be unable to distinguish who originated that Tor circuit
ryonaloli_
i really don't know. i think that having the guard *right ext to you* would be a bad idea, but i can't specify why
D3RP
oh good
I love not being banned on join
lelope
ok hi
hi velope
hi
i would like
1 invite only
to go
you know
it doesnt depress me at all
when you set +i
i sleep like a baby
:3
ryonaloli_
guh
kationie
invite me to #nottor plz
Raiz
suelin: why, you can't join?
kvm234
suelin: can you still go to #notnottor?
Guest692
I'm seeing this output in my middle-relay setup: "Configured hibernation. This interval began at 2015-09-05 00:00:00; the scheduled wake-up time is 2015-09-10 08:51:30; we expect to exhaust our quota for this interval around 2015-09-17 12:51:30; the next interval begins at 2015-10-05 00:00:00 (all times local)"
what does that mean?
why is tor hibernating and not running? Accounting period starts today and tor has not crossed the bandwidth (used ony 7MB of allowed 490MB)
TvdW
the period starts today, but it doesn't necessarily start today
it'll wake up on the 10th
qwerty1
even onions get tired and nned to sleep
Guest692
TvdW: oh, so I can shutdown the system then?
TvdW
as in power it off? sure
Guest692
TvdW: Also, I'm seeing " Failed to unlink /var/lib/tor/bw_accounting: No such file or directory" in the log
TvdW
it's trying to delete a file that's not there... I wouldn't worry about it
Guest692
and even though tor says "look for *-stats files.." there's no such files being written
qwerty1
no that's how it should be
dont worry
Guest692
qwerty1: oh, I see
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